The DEW Line

It's the Gas, Stupid

The US Air Force has just issued a rather innocuous-looking notice for a new technology called "active combustion control". But this is quite a momentous development, and here's why.

Today, the air force has two kinds of warplanes that can survive in modern and future combat, in which fighters and bombers have to compete with integrated air defenses as well as increasingly sophisticated enemy fighters.

One kind is the Northrop Grumman B-2A bomber. It's relatively slow, but super-stealthy. It can fly for a long time and drop a lot of weapons.

The other kind is like the Lockheed Martin F-22A. It's extremely fast and also super-stealthy. But it doesn't fly for very long without refuelling and can carry only a couple of strike weapons (okay, eight if you're talking about the Small Diameter Bomb).

The missing link is a single aircraft as nimble as the F-22, as long-range as the B-2 and as at least as stealthy as both. In short, it's the dream warplane for every gadget-hearting air force general.

And it is the basic concept for what the air force now calls the Next Generation Long Range Strike aircraft. It's supposed to be ready to enter service by 2018 to 2020.

The trick to meeting this schedule is for some company to come up with the next breakthrough in aircraft engine technology. The breakthrough is called active combustion control, which is just a fancy name for integrating a fuel injector into an aircraft's propulsion system.

Aircraft engines using active combustion controls should be able to fly longer distances at a lower rate of fuel consumption.

With today's engine technology, the flow of gas into the combustion chamber is fairly unrestricted, which is not very efficient. Many years ago, the automotive industry fixed this problem with fuel injectors, and now the aerospace industry wants to make a similar leap -- although at a far greater level of sophistication.

It's a new spin on old concept. In the past, aircraft designers used variable-geometry wings (think: F-111, F-14 and B-1) to be more efficient in high-speed and cruise-speed. With active combustion controls, the goal is to reconfigure the engine instead of the airframe to be optimal in both states.

The Infantry's Curse

Somebody please help the infantry.

Since the 1960s, think of how many new generations of fighters, naval combatants and fighting vehicles have been deployed?

Contrast that record to the individual firearm -- the rifle, carbine or handgun carried and used by almost any one wearing a uniform. The same basic M16 rifle and M4 carbine first used in Vietnam -- with the same basic flaws still uncorrected -- remain the primary infantry weapons for the US military today.

Why?

Surely, a nation that can muster $250-$300 billion to develop and deliver the Joint Strike Fighter, $160 billion to build a new family of combat vehicles and $8 billion to develop and build a next-generation aircraft carrier can come up with some spare change to upgrade the infantry's arsenal of automatic weapons.

All the services are fond of promoting the concept of dominating any potential threat through superior technology. Yet the M16 and M4 remain matched -- if not inferior -- to the firepower provided by the weapon of choice for insurgents/terrorists/pirates worldwide: the even older AK-47 design and its antecedents. 

A new generation of superior guns are available for purchase today, offering improved firepower and less of the reliability problems of the older generation. Examples include the Heckler & Koch 416 enhanced carbine and the FN Herstal Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR).

Giving the army more cash may not be the answer. Part of the problem is the way the army manages small arms. Back in the 1950s, the army was so loathe to develop an automatic rifle to compete with the AK-47 that some think it sabotaged tests on the M16. It fell upon Air Force General Curtis LeMay to rescue the M16 program and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to compel the army to buy it. Even then, the army sabotaged the M16 by initially filling the cartridge with the wrong gunpowder. (Read more here.)

More recently, the army aborted its plan to replace the M16 with the XM29, which was cancelled in 2005 after a $100 million investment.

The good news is that the commercial marketplace has already solved the army's problem. The question is whether the army is willing to bring itself to make the change.

FY08 Unfunded Priority Lists

SOCOM needed only one page. The navy and the army each required three. The air force -- God bless 'em -- burned up 426 pages.  Go figure.

• US Navy: Download USN_FY08_UPL.pdf
• US Special Operations Command: Download SOCOM_FY08_UPL.pdf
• US Army: Download USA_FY08_UPL.pdf
• US Air Force: Download af_unfunded_priorities_list_2007.pdf

The Wideband Revolt Begins

The Pentagon's strategy for network-centric warfare used to be pretty simple. In the short-term, everybody is supposed to live with a bunch of narrowband data links. Later on, big-ticket programs like Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), Warfighter Information Networking Technology (WIN-T) and Transformational Satellite Communciations (TSAT) are supposed make on-the-move wideband networking a reality.

That strategy is suddenly starting to unravel. There are three problems.

The first starts with the fact that JTRS, WIN-T and TSAT won't be fully operational until well into the NEXT decade. The second problem is that they aren't really needed -- the same basic technology is widely available on the commercial market today. And the third problem is that the "warfighters" want this stuff today -- not in 2017.

Thus, it's no surprise when Harris and BAE Systems announce today that they've stripped the Highband Networking Radio (HNR) off of WIN-T, and have commenced marketing it as a stand-alone upgrade for a supposed gapfiller called the Joint Network Node. Once more people realize that on-the-move wideband can be purchased today, The DEW Line predicts the big-ticket programs are going to be in more trouble than most are already in.

Ex-Spook Goes EDO

In the inaugural installment of The DEW Line's "Revolving Door" series, we give you retired General John A. Gordon. From October 1997 until June 2000, this former US Air Force four-star general served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. He had previously been Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support.

Mr. Gordon, welcome to the Board of Directors at EDO Corp.

Known mostly as a defense electronics house, EDO has been attacking the intelligence market lately, acquiring three companies to form a new business sector within the company called Intelligence and Information Warfare business sector.

Blame Rumsfeld (Part 1 ...)

Donald Rumsfeld is the ultimate punching bag.

Not only did he screw up the Iraq War, he also left the Bush Administration. That makes him the perfect target both within Republican circles and without. So forget about the careerist generals who let themselves get rolled by the Donalator, nevermind the Congressional overseers who looked the other way and -- oh yes -- forget about that other guy who is supposed to have a sign on his desk saying: "The buck stops here."

It is all Rumsfeld's fault.

That certainly seems the thrust of the first book we've seen that solely examines the total legacy of this man. The book, by "national security insider" Andrew Cockburn is called "Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy".

And Cockburn really means it when he says "catastrophic".

Fun fact: Rumsfeld didn't just foul things up in the Middle East. Cockburn also blames Rusmfeld for unleashing aspartame on an unsuspecting public and playing a major role in the electoral downfall of Gerald R. Ford in 1976. (Aspartame? Yes.)

Cockburn does better when he sticks to his knitting with the national security gossip circuit. His accounts of Rumsfeld's impact on weapons technology bear the mark of an amateur. For example, Texas and South Dakota will be surprised to learn that the entire B-1 fleet is based in Kansas. And The DEW Line was bemused to read that the military has nothing to replace the Milstar satellite constellation if Rumsfeld's beloved Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) system isn't ready before 2014 (er, what about Wideband Gapfiller? What about the Advanced Extremely High Frequency constellation? For that matter, what about cheap commercial transponders?).

Someday, history will give us a fair account of the Rumsfeld legacy, which to be sure will make for some gruesome reading. Until then, we'll have to make do with hatchet jobs like this.

Zakheim: The Anti-Merc

Mercenaries, beware: Dov Zakheim (remember him?) doesn't like you.

Zakheim is a bona fide fat cat of the defense industry, a privileged member of the ultimate Old Boys Club. He used to sign checks for the DOD; now he collects them as a vice president for a big defense consulting firm.

(Ah, the cycle of life.)

This means a lot of things about Zakheim, but mainly it means that The DEW Line listens when Mr. Zakheim decides to make a point.

And he has decided to make a point about private military contractors, which in a former age were simply called either mercenaries or camp followers.

In a published review of three recent books on the topic, Zakheim makes it clear that he thinks the Blackwaters and DynCorps of the world are doing more harm than good. Put another way, he's saying DOD and other national security agencies are wasting their money. We recommend you read the full article (warning: registration required, but it's free). Here's an excerpt with his conclusions:

No matter how capable military contractors might be when deployed in combat-related areas, they will not achieve the aims of the governments that hired them. To be sure, they will remain an important supplement to military forces, providing critical noncombat service support that would otherwise have to be performed by highly trained servicemen and servicewomen who are best employed in combat roles. But military contractors cannot act effectively as soldiers in the long run. Worse still, they may well undermine their clients’ military aims, because they will add to the resentments of those already embittered populations that view the United States as an alien occupier.

Despite the glory that Colonel Schumacher ascribes to such contractors, and the wealth that Professor Kinsey and Mr. Pelton claim they have earned, undermining military aims is exactly what they appear to be doing in Iraq, and perhaps in Afghanistan. When all is said and done, the political and strategic consequences of their activities in both countries are still unknown — and as has often been the case with mercenaries in the past, we will not be in a position to judge the results until it is too late to do anything about them.

Iran Has the Bomb (well, maybe)

Accusing countries of harboring secret weapons programs is SOOOO 2003, but, as tweed is to fashion, some global security fads never truly go out of style.

The hardest working man in political-military affairs, Anthony Cordesman has a new report out that helps us understand the Bush Administration's current obsession with Iran's nuclear ambitions.

He concludes that, yes, Iran very, very likely has a nuclear weapons program. For him, the "smoking gun" ("smoking mushroom cloud" anyone? -- or did Bush ruin that metaphor?) are Iran's on-going medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile programs. Since Iran doesn't have the guidance technology to make such weapons useful in a conventional strike, the existence of these programs only makes sense if they are the REAL THING.

Russia Is Winning

It's a dead-heat between the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the Mikoyan MiG-35. France's Dassault Rafale and Sweeden's Saab/BAE Systems Gripen are not serious players. The competition may actually be just a proxy fight for deciding who can help India's civil nuclear infrastructure the most.

We are referring to the competition in India for a USD6 billion contract to replace a Soviet-era Mig fleet with 126 new multi-role jets. (Great Indian air force site here.)

The analysis above comes not from us, but from a far more knowledgeable (and surprisingly helpful) source: the Russian ambassador to New Dehli.

The Sky Is Falling (Part 1) ...

This new academic paper claims Boeing, Airbus and Bombardier are well-along on a path to "strategic destruction".

To sum up, outsourcing to Asian companies is bad because one day they will become stronger than the Western companies that now employ them and we will all become their slaves.

Or something like that.

The DEW Line detects a slight bent towards industrial xenophobia in this paper, but perhaps it's just being frighteningly rational. Your thoughts?