The DEW Line

Aerial Common Sensor Is Re-born

You might think the army would still be shy over publicity for the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS, for short).

Some of you will recall that ACS was the acquisition program that got cancelled in January 2006 in a most embarrassing fashion.

Somehow, Lockheed Martin promised the army that they could squeeze a 20,000-pound sensor on an aircraft with only 14,000lbs of extra room, and the army bought it. There were lots of reasons and justifications given for the oversight, but, really, it was just a dumb mistake. The army threw away $200 million and five years of wasted time.

So it was a bit surprising this week to see ACS back in an army news release.

Of course, the need remains to replace the army’s RC-7 and RC-12 with a spy aircraft built after the Apple IIe computer generation. (The navy’s need to replace the EP-3 also lurks in the background, but they have other options than ACS.)

So, for the army, the need remains, but so does the question: how?

The ACS is supposed to be a platform that can see all and hear all. In the intelligence world, that means you need a very sophisticated TV camera and an antenna receiver that can pick up everything from a high-bandwidth fire control radar system to a low-bandwidth cell phone held by the trigger-man of an improvised explosive device.

That is asking a lot for any one sensor to do.

With so many competing demands for cash, a next-generation spy aircraft may not be at the top of the army’s budget priority list.

Look for the army to start cheap with an “off-the-shelf” sensor. One candidate often floated in industry circles is Northrop Grumman’s Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP). It is already flying aboard the U-2 spy plane and is selected for two unmanned aircraft – the RQ-4 Global Hawk and MQ-9B Predator.

The TV camera – also known in the military as a charge-coupled device (CCD) -- may be added to this system, or that part of the payload could be outsourced to another unmanned aircraft, such as the army’s RQ-7 Shadow or MQ-12 Warrior.

Super Dogs

I'd like to make an announcement.

After four years and who-knows-how-many-billions, the Department of Defense has discovered a new potential sensor solution for the problem of detecting mines, such as improvised explosive devices.

I give you the newly-unveiled pilot program for the "Munitions of Concern Detection Dog".

Chew on that term "munitions of concern" for a while too.

Globalize This

Let’s call it a bad week for the forces of globalization in the defense industry.

Not that there’s ever been a truly good week, mind you.

On Tuesday, ITT Corporation pleaded guilty to illegally outsourcing components of a night vision goggle to suppliers in China, Singapore and the UK without an export license.

On Thursday, a small defense contractor named Axion Corporation was indicted for allegedly doing the same thing with a component of the UH-60 Black Hawk.

Axion is still innocent until proven guilty, of course.

But it’s not difficult to imagine the temptations. You’re a defense contractor. Your customer wants you to cut your costs. You know that by outsourcing a small and seemingly innocent component of your military system to a foreign (read: cheaper) supplier, you could shave costs. But to do so you’d have to get an export license, and you know the foreign supplier would probably walk rather than have to endure that process. So you give the foreigners the deal on the sly and hope nobody is paying attention.

Welcome to the underbelly of this new era of globalized arms traders. I'm sure many such transactions occur completely legally, with all the appropriate licenses and reviews completed. But, given the suddenness of these two cases, one wonders if we're just seeing the proverbial tip of the iceberg.

Anybody who wants to learn more about the forces of globalization in the defense business should read a new monograph published by the Security Studies Institute at the Army War College. The paper, which was published on March 15, is titled, “Globalization and its Implications for the Defense Industrial Base.” I’ll give you the excerpt with the author’s conclusion:

“Globalization in many ways has strengthened the hand of defense companies at the expense of national governments. With more opportunities to expand their international presence, governments, at times, are being required to make concessions that would have been unheard of even a decade ago.”

Pratt (or Rentschler) Day

‘Media Day’ at Pratt & Whitney headquarters was yesterday. I was there and so were 10 top Pratt executives and about other 15 reporters.

After a mercifully brief corporate presentation in the morning, reporters got paired up with half-hour individual interviews with sector presidents for space, military, commercial, engineering and so forth.

One executive called it the PR equivalent of “speed dating”.

Fun fact: the founder of Pratt & Whitney was not named Pratt or Whitney. It was a man named Rentschler. I asked several people, but no one could tell me why a man named Rentschler would go to all the trouble of creating an engine company only to name his own company “Pratt & Whitney”.

As an employee for a British defense (oops, I mean ‘defence’) publishing company called Jane’s, I might be a little sensitive to the oddities of company names.

Finally, a Pratt executive I met at media day knew the answer. I never got the executive’s name, but he must not be too important at Pratt because he was the only executive forced to sit with a table full of journalists for lunch.

He explained that Rentschler was not an engineer, but had the brilliant thought that an air-cooled engine could solve a lot of problems for the fledgling aviation business. Rentschler’s brother was a banker, who gave his sibling the capital he needed to buy a machine and tooling shop. The shop was called Pratt & Whitney. The company went on to build the Wasp engine, which revolutionized the technology of aircraft engines.

These days, Pratt & Whitney has another big idea: the geared turbofan engine. The company believes this is the technology that will propel (pardon the pun) the company back into the commercial airliner business, after losing its footing in the 1980s by sticking too long with the JT8D despite the arrival of the GE/Snecma CFM56.

Modern turbofans work by splitting the airflow into air that bypasses the engine core and the air that goes through the engine core. The larger the ratio of air that bypasses the core, the more efficient an engine can be at subsonic speeds. By introducing a gear into the turbofan, Pratt is seeking to double or triple the ratio, making any airliner instantly about 20-25 percent more efficient.

If the technology works, Pratt will have a great product to put on the market early in the next decade just as Boeing and Airbus unveil the next-generation of single-aisle airliners to replace the B737 and A320. If the technology fails, Pratt will be in big trouble, with no viable commercial engine business after the V2500 passes its prime.

Er, no pressure.

How the US Buys Weapons

"The weapon systems acquisition process apparently is out of control. Initial time and cost estimates and even updated estimates cannot be depended upon. Mandatory engineering changes arise continually throughout the process. Management information and control systems do not identify impending problems in time for preventive action to be taken."

I am quoting from the book "Arming America: How the US Buys Weapons", by J. Ronald Fox.

It was published in 1972. From 1969 - 1971, Fox served as assistant secretary of the army for procurement.

The quoted section above comes from page 4, and is the first of four points he makes to summarize what's wrong with the acquisition process. Thirty-five years later, the same basic problems can be found described in almost any recent GAO report.

I'm heading up to Pratt & Whitney today for a media tour, so in lieu of my own writing, I'll instead re-publish his other three points about the problems of the DOD acquisition system in the early 1970s.

"Second is the claim that bargaining positions are unbalanced; first one side, then the other has the advantage. The theory of countervailing pressures acting to produce fair and realistic contract terms does not hold. With emphasis on economies of scale and series production there are only a small number of weapon systems competitions each year and prospective contractors believe that their very existence may be jeopardized by failure to win. Hence the DOD is in the dominat position and can compel an unreasonable bargain. Following award of the contract, the DOD, committed to the timely success of the program, is in the weaker position as the sole source contractor negotiates for contract changes, product acceptance and follow-on business.

Third is that incentives both for efficient operation and for candor about expectations are lacking. Heavy reliance on historical costs in pricing, lack of adequate consideration of capital required in negotiating profit rates, and the high risk of low future utilization of contractor-owned facilities impede investment and modernization of the plant. The hazard of program survival, of high cost, long duration, or looming technical difficulties, as each program competes with others in and out of the DOD, motivates extreme optimism by DOD and contractor personnel alike.

Fourth are allegations of confusion connivance and deception by the DOD-contractor combination. Close cooperation and common interest are held in contrast to the arm's length relationship preferred by much of regulation and policy. Policy notwithstanding, the military departments receive advice and assistance from prospective contractors in preparation of requests for proposals. Contractors receive aid from government personnel in performance of contract. Contracts fail as instruments of control.    

 

Special Forces Say 'No' to the M4 (barrel)

If somebody wanted to really help the US Army, they would do something about those godawful M4 carbines that American troops are forced to endure.

This is a recurring theme in this blog, and I'm returning to it again because of yet new information that sheds light on the problem with the army's standard-issue weapon for close-in fighting -- which is exactly the kind of combat that is raging in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

In a routine acquisition notice (see this link), a US Special Forces battalion based in Okinawa announced that it is buying 84 barrels for the Heckler & Koch HK416 asssault rifle.

The HK barrels will be used to replace the barrels on their own M4s.

Why? Here's what the notice says:

The 416 barrel "allows soldiers to replace the existing M4 upper receiver with an HK proprietary gas system that does not introduce propellant gases and the associated carbon fouling back into the weapon's interior. This reduces operator cleaning time, and increases the reliability of the M4 Carbine, particularly in an environment in which sand and dust are prevalent. The elimination of the gas tube ... means that the M4 will function normally even if the weapon is fired full of water without first being drained. There isn't another company that offers these features in their products. It is a practical, versatile system."

Translation: the M4 barrel is so unreliable that special forces units need to swap it out with a barrel from a different gun -- and one that actually works in real combat conditions.

One solution is to simply swap out the barrel.

But here's another good answer: trash the M4s and just buy HK416s!

Sufas For Sale

Well done to Defense News for this huge scoop: Lockheed Martin may offer the Indian Air Force a clone of the Israeli Air Force F-16I Sufa.

This is the latest twist in the most important international arms deal of the year. India is soliciting bids for a contract to buy 126 multi-role fighters with extensive industrial participation on Indian soil. The winner not only gets a multi-billion dollar contract, but also a new best friend in the heart of Asia.

Selling the F-16I to India would seem to solve a lot of problems for the US side, the most important being the dilemma posed by exporting sensitive US military technology to a country that has a standing military cooperation agreement with Iran. The F-16I, which features missiles and an air combat system designed in Israel, has the advantage of being already cleared for export. The $45-$50 million F-16I also has a more competitive price tag when compared to a bargain-bin Russian SU-35.

The loser of such a deal on the US side would clearly be Boeing, which is seeking to offer the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Pound-for-pound, the Super Hornet is probably the more advanced aircraft. But how does Boeing obtain an export license for the highly-sensitive active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, not to mention the Super Hornet's other sensitive pieces and parts?

On the other hand, a big shortcoming of the F-16I is the lack of an AESA radar, which comes standard with the F/A-18E/F Block II and is a new option offered by the Russians and the French (Dassault Rafale). While the F-16I's Northrop Grumman APG-68(V)9 could be the most advanced mechanically-scanned radar on the market, it is still a notch below the capability of the AESA equipped on the F-16 Block 60 sold to the United Arab Emirates.

I don't know if it's possible, but Lockheed Martin may need to consider shifting the Northrop Grumman APG-80 AESA on the F-16 Block 60 to the F-16I to make a truly competitive offer. That also avoids some of the trouble with export license, since the APG-80 is so far the only AESA radar exported to any country in any known fighter sale to date.

The JSF Numbers Game

Start thinking about two sets of numbers. They are:

1. 5-16-47
2. 2-12-16

The first series of numbers is good. The second series of numbers is disturbing.

I'll explain.

Number 1 is the original production rate for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. Look it up here (see the chart on page 6). This means the  plan was to buy 5 this year, 16 next year, and then make a huge leap to 47 in 2009.

Number 2 is the new production rate, as described in this year's updated spending forecast (see the chart on page 7). So now the US military is buying 2 F-35s this year, 12 next year and only 16 in 2009.

Consider that huge gap in 2009. The old plan called for producing 47 aircraft. The new plan would buy only 16.

Recall that the original business case for the Joint Strike Fighter rested foremost on affordability. A huge driver of affordability is production rate. The more that can be produced, the greater the economies of scale and so forth. If production rate falls, the average unit cost of each aircraft will likely go up.

Under the new spending plan, the US military won't approach the original number for 2009 until 2012. (Also, to make even this schedule work, please assume the flight test phase on the weight-optimized aircraft goes off without a hitch.)

So what does this mean?

• First, it means the US military may not be able to enter full-rate production for JSF until two or three years after 2012, unless the program decides to lower the threshold for what the term "full rate production" means.
• If JSF full rate production is delayed by two or three years, the air force has a new reason to extend F-22 full rate production by two or three years. Recall that the air force wants to keep an active full-rate production line for a fifth-generation fighter, so it follows that a delay for JSF requires an extension of F-22. At current production rates on F-22, a two-to-three year delay could mean an extra 40-60 aircraft.
• The first export versions of JSF may still be available in 2014, but the average unit production cost must be significantly higher than in the original plan.

For Whom the Bell Tolls

Bell Helicopter Textron must stop work on the ARH-70 Arapaho. After a nearly one-year schedule slip, mounting technical problems and a recent crash of a prototype on its maiden flight, the army decided it was time for a re-think.

At least that puts the Arapaho in good company.

I'll start with the HV-911 Eagle Eye, the unmanned tiltrotor that developed a problem with staying in the air. How much money did the US Coast Guard sink into that program before they finally pulled the plug? 

What about the H-1 Upgrades Program? It was orginally a roughly $3 billion program to remanufacture a total of 180 UH-1H Hueys and AH-1W Super Cobras. It is now a more than $8 billion prorgram to mostly remanufacture 180 UH-1H Hueys and AH-1W Super Cobras (some new-build UH-1Ys are now included in the total).  That means the army is paying about $45 million per aircraft for (deep-breath) mostly re-built Hueys and Cobras. For perspective, a brand new (and much, much larger) CH-47F Chinook costs about $31 million.

And then there's the V-22. I've flown on the V-22. It's a good aircraft and it can do some amazing things. The US Marine Corps will no doubt put it to good use. Some people remain convinced it's a death trap, but the conventional wisdom says the program is finally in the clear. How long did it take to get to this point? How many unnecessary crashes and lives lost? How many program re-baselines, manufacturing crises and design screw-ups did it take?

Bell is the home of some brilliant aerodynamicists and engineers. This is the company that invented the super-sonic aircraft (Yeager's X-1 Glamorous Glennis). For its time, the design of the original H-1 Huey was a major leap in technology. The V-22 tiltrotor program may have been deeply flawed in execution, but the design and concept obviously was the product of great minds.

The standard for complexity in military technology continues to rise. Aircraft manufacturing is not just about bending metal, but about integrating a "system".

At some point, Bell needs to show that it still belongs among the ranks of viable military aircraft manufacturers.

Spotted: ARH Is Dead ... or Is It?

Is the contract for ARH -- the army's ARH-71A Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter made by Bell Helicopter -- dead or not?

David S. Harvey, a very good journalist on rotorcraft issues for Shephard's, may have a huge scoop today at Rotorhub.com that says yes.

ARH: Bolton issues Show Cause letter; other options being studied

The US Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) for the ARH was held Tuesday and chaired by Claude Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology/Army Acquisition Executive.  As a result, Bolton issued a Show Cause letter to Bell stating that the Army had no confidence in Bell's ability to execute the ARH program.

Expect a T4C (termination for convenience) soon.  This leaves the future of the program in doubt and gives weight to previous reports in rotorhub.com that a OH-58D modernisation program using a different sensor system is being considered or that the Army may extend the EC145 LUH program to include an armed scout version.

An email requesting comment has been sent to Bell.

But Rebecca Christie, a very good Pentagon journalist for Dow Jones, published a story yesterday that says no.

  WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--The U.S. Army on Wednesday said Textron Inc.'s (TXT)

Bell Helicopter unit will keep its Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter contract for

now, after a program review this week.

More to follow ...