The DEW Line

The JSF Numbers Game

Start thinking about two sets of numbers. They are:

1. 5-16-47
2. 2-12-16

The first series of numbers is good. The second series of numbers is disturbing.

I'll explain.

Number 1 is the original production rate for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. Look it up here (see the chart on page 6). This means the  plan was to buy 5 this year, 16 next year, and then make a huge leap to 47 in 2009.

Number 2 is the new production rate, as described in this year's updated spending forecast (see the chart on page 7). So now the US military is buying 2 F-35s this year, 12 next year and only 16 in 2009.

Consider that huge gap in 2009. The old plan called for producing 47 aircraft. The new plan would buy only 16.

Recall that the original business case for the Joint Strike Fighter rested foremost on affordability. A huge driver of affordability is production rate. The more that can be produced, the greater the economies of scale and so forth. If production rate falls, the average unit cost of each aircraft will likely go up.

Under the new spending plan, the US military won't approach the original number for 2009 until 2012. (Also, to make even this schedule work, please assume the flight test phase on the weight-optimized aircraft goes off without a hitch.)

So what does this mean?

• First, it means the US military may not be able to enter full-rate production for JSF until two or three years after 2012, unless the program decides to lower the threshold for what the term "full rate production" means.
• If JSF full rate production is delayed by two or three years, the air force has a new reason to extend F-22 full rate production by two or three years. Recall that the air force wants to keep an active full-rate production line for a fifth-generation fighter, so it follows that a delay for JSF requires an extension of F-22. At current production rates on F-22, a two-to-three year delay could mean an extra 40-60 aircraft.
• The first export versions of JSF may still be available in 2014, but the average unit production cost must be significantly higher than in the original plan.

For Whom the Bell Tolls

Bell Helicopter Textron must stop work on the ARH-70 Arapaho. After a nearly one-year schedule slip, mounting technical problems and a recent crash of a prototype on its maiden flight, the army decided it was time for a re-think.

At least that puts the Arapaho in good company.

I'll start with the HV-911 Eagle Eye, the unmanned tiltrotor that developed a problem with staying in the air. How much money did the US Coast Guard sink into that program before they finally pulled the plug? 

What about the H-1 Upgrades Program? It was orginally a roughly $3 billion program to remanufacture a total of 180 UH-1H Hueys and AH-1W Super Cobras. It is now a more than $8 billion prorgram to mostly remanufacture 180 UH-1H Hueys and AH-1W Super Cobras (some new-build UH-1Ys are now included in the total).  That means the army is paying about $45 million per aircraft for (deep-breath) mostly re-built Hueys and Cobras. For perspective, a brand new (and much, much larger) CH-47F Chinook costs about $31 million.

And then there's the V-22. I've flown on the V-22. It's a good aircraft and it can do some amazing things. The US Marine Corps will no doubt put it to good use. Some people remain convinced it's a death trap, but the conventional wisdom says the program is finally in the clear. How long did it take to get to this point? How many unnecessary crashes and lives lost? How many program re-baselines, manufacturing crises and design screw-ups did it take?

Bell is the home of some brilliant aerodynamicists and engineers. This is the company that invented the super-sonic aircraft (Yeager's X-1 Glamorous Glennis). For its time, the design of the original H-1 Huey was a major leap in technology. The V-22 tiltrotor program may have been deeply flawed in execution, but the design and concept obviously was the product of great minds.

The standard for complexity in military technology continues to rise. Aircraft manufacturing is not just about bending metal, but about integrating a "system".

At some point, Bell needs to show that it still belongs among the ranks of viable military aircraft manufacturers.

Tuesdays with Ike

This morning I and about 25 other reporters had breakfast with Representative Ike Skelton, the newly-empowered chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Skelton is not like your average member of Congress. He is an intellectual as much as a politician, capable of transitioning from a feel-good anecdote from his district in rural Missouri to a dissertation on geo-political strategy -- and I mean strategy with a capital "S".

Over a $30 plate of soggy eggs, burnt bacon and mushy potatos, I didn't pick up a shred of what reasonably can be called news, yet I learned three very unexpected things.

1. The fruits of Congressional pork won the Battle of Midway in World War II (who knew?)
2. If the NATO expedition to Afghanistan fails, the geo-strategic winner is... (I'll get to that a bit later)
3. Drought is killing the livelihoods of dairy farmers in Missiouri (natch)

To start from the top, Skelton was asked about the amount of pork contained in a recent version of this year's supplemental bill for emergency war spending. He didn't exactly defend the added largesse, but noted that if wasn't for Congressional plus-ups, the US Navy would have lost the Battle of Midway. (A big "huh???" was scratched in my notebook.)

Luckily, I happened to be seated next to Otto Kreisher, the veteran of the Copley News Service bureau in Washington DC, but more importantly -- as an ex-naval officer -- a known expert on all matters maritime. A moment after the breakfast ended, I turned to Otto and asked, "So how did Congressional pork win the Battle of Midway."

Otto, of course, knew the full history: It was the Great Depression. Congress wanted some jobs programs. Aircraft carriers would mean A LOT of jobs. The navy didn't want them, believing the old ships of the line battleships would win the next naval war. But Congress overrode their concerns and paid for them anyway.

Like I said, not very newsy. But very interesting. If you read this blog and my posts about MurthaFest, you'll know that I am inclined to challenge the legislative system that creates anonymous earmarks. So Skelton made me think a little.

And then there was the part about NATO's ongoing struggles in Afghanistan. Skelton noted with some aggravation that only four NATO countries -- the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and the US -- allow their forces to operate in Afghanistan without restriction. Skelton seemed very concerned that the NATO deployment could end up a disaster. And then he said this:

"If NATO is seen as a loser in Afghanistan and things fall apart and NATO becomes a shell and seen as ineffective or collapses ... who benefits? Think about this."

It took a few moments for the reporters in the room to realize that he wasn't being rhetorical. He wanted us to answer the question. (Uh ... the Warsaw Pact?)

Again, it was Otto who had the answer: "Well there's no more Soviet Union, but is it Russia?" he said.

"You got it," Skelton said.

Ward Carroll: V-22 Whistleblower?

With apologies to the entire rap community: If your former flack is talking smack, your program might be really whack.

Ward Carroll is the former public affairs officer for the V-22 development program. He is now editorial proprietor of my old employer Military.com and one of the leading lights of DefenseTech.org.

Here's what he has to say today about the V-22:

"In the first three years of fleet V-22 operations, the Marines will suffer six Class A flight mishaps with the Osprey. And here's how:

- Although VMMT-204, the Osprey RAG, is up and running, the pilots training there are relatively senior compared to other RAGs. Eventually true "nuggets" will make their way to the fleet and they will do "nugget" things.

- The test pilots (both active duty and civilian) did amazing work during the High Rate of Descent (HROD) phase of developmental test at NAS Patuxent River back in 2002 and 2003. They validated the V-22's vortex ring state (VRS) envelope. (DT readers will remember that VRS was what caused an Osprey to crash near Marana, Arizona back in 2000, killing 19 Marines.) Improvements have been made in the vertical speed displays and aural warning systems. But the fact remains that - while there are no "unknown unknowns" about VRS and that there is a buffer between the operational rate of descent limit of 800 feet per minute and where VRS occurs - the rate at which the V-22 develops a high rate of descent is unique to the V-22. Basically, the crew has to hawk the VSI gauge constantly during a descent. A moment's inattention can result in the VSI getting out of hand. (The test pilots actually had an inadvertant VRS entry during HROD testing because they got distracted for a second.) So imagine junior pilots during high op-tempo periods (deployed) at night, on goggles, and operating with not enough sleep (never happens if you follow NATOPS, right?) Yes, this is a training issue in that crews can be taught to watch the VSI readout on the display, but in spite of the comprehensive understanding Osprey crews have of the phenomenon (thanks to the Developmental Test Team at Pax River), somebody's going to be tired and distracted (and maybe under fire) and will enter VRS close to the ground. The outcome won't be good.

- It's unclear at this point whether or not VMM-263 will self-deploy or embark on an amphib like most USMC assault support aircraft. If they conduct sustained flight ops from an LHA or LHD, again, we will see nuggets do nugget-like things. Somebody will fly into the water while on final approach; somebody will plant one against the deck edge. And I guarantee you these things will happen at night or in bad weather.

- Ospreys will operate as multi-ships, so there's a high likelihood of a midair. Once again, when it occurs it'll be at night.

- An Osprey will be lost due to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).

- An Osprey will have an engine failure (or fire) and be forced into an extended transit to get to somewhere safe to land. During the transit the interconnect drive shaft will fail. (The one true test of the interconnect drive shaft was very early in the program's history. The mechanism failed grossly.)

- The Osprey has survivability features like self-sealing tanks and composite structures that will allow the airplane to take hits and keep on going. However, one of the other features of a composite fuselage is bullets don't bounce off, they pass through like a hot knife through butter. The airplane may survive an encounter with small arms fire, but Marines flying in back might not. Another prediction: Just like the Humvee, the Marines will "up-armor" V-22s in time. They didn't do it to date because that would've kept the airplane from attaining its Key Performance Parameters (payload, range, etc.) during OPEVAL.

So that equals six lost aircraft (seven if you believe the midair will result in the loss of both Ospreys).

Baby's First Afterburner

For now and for the next few years, the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter is the proverbial baby of the aerospace industry family.

Every ‘first’ this infant aircraft design makes will be ooh’d and ahh’d over, simply by virtue of it being the baby. Even the cranky uncles (like me) will crack a smile.

And so it goes with the first lighting of the F-35’s afterburner during a takeoff.

This great piece – written by my old colleague (okay, ex-boss) Graham Warwick – describes the moment earlier this week that the F-35’s 40,000lb-thrust monster of an engine went thermonuclear.

That being said, lighting an afterburner is one of the simplest tricks of the aerospace engineering profession, dating back to the dawn of the jet age in the 1950s. With the right tools, you can even try it at home. Just spray kerosene into a blast of super-heated air and watch what happens. (Okay, maybe don’t.)

This whole show over the JSF is cute for now. But, just like a baby who grows into a toddler and eventually an adolescent, the enthusiasm for some of its personality quirks will fade. Some features may become downright annoying.

How will that afterburning engine of the JSF be appreciated in 15 or 20 years, I wonder?

It is sometimes said that the JSF is the last manned fighter to be built, and that may yet prove true although the jury is still out.

But it’s arguably a lock that the F-35 will be the last fighter designed without regard to the rate of specific fuel consumption.

Two trends in aerial warfare are clear: gas-guzzlers are ‘out’ and engine efficiency is ‘in’. Long-range strike, the object of the air force’s current high-tech fixation, demands an aircraft that hoards gas like it was liquid gold. Super-speed will still be desirable, but for the first time speed will not be the over-riding criteria if it means damaging engine efficiency.

Porpoise vs Hair

China announced last week that it will spend 18% more on defense in 2007, the largest one-year jump in a decade for the People's Liberation Army.

It's an arms race!

Finally, sixteen years after the Soviet Union went to that great "ash heap of history" in the sky, the Pentagon's big-spenders have a reason to justify ... well, everything, in the name of preserving military superiority, of course.

Or perhaps not.

The PLA has announced that it intends to spend about $45 billion on defense this year. Double this figure if you prefer, as some experts quite rationally believe that China significantly under-reports defense expenditures. So, just suppose, the PLA spends, say, $80-90 billion a year on defense.

Ok, that's a lot of change. But let's keep this in perspective, shall we? The US Department of Defense is seeking to spend $600 billion this year, which is quite nearly an actual order of magnitude more than the PLA. 

If this is an arms race, this isn't even the tortoise and the hair. This is more like a porpoise and the hair -- on land.

That said, there are some things China's PLA is doing that deserves some calm, rational levels of concern. Blowing up space satellites, for instance. Bulking up their submarine fleet is another. Designing a new, moveable, long-range nuclear missile -- not good.

But let's put this in perspective. Using the term "arms race" conjures up an image of the old Soviet-US/NATO competition. That was a high-stakes power struggle over the spread and denial of influence and power on a global scale.

Comparing that to the current PLA military build-up does the Cold War a monumental disservice. 

The strategy of the PLA build-up is focused almost exclusively on the Taiwan Strait. Yes, China certainly wants to exert more influence in its region. But the military build-up of the past decade is all about Taiwan. The PLA was embarassed in 1996 when President Clinton ordered two carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait, and the PLA knew it had no ability to respond. Its entire modernization effort since that time has been focused on that one scenario.

It is reasonable for the US to respond to this as a new challenge, and the US Navy already is. A sophisticated anti-submarine warfare system is being designed. Ship-based defenses against a new class of Chinese tactical ballistic missiles -- potentially with a new maritime strike capability -- are being tested. All these things are logical and proper.

But, everyone, just stop calling it an arms race.

Quote of the Day

From a very good Kansas City Star article about the usefulness (or not) of the 30,000lb Massive Ordnance Penetrator:

“If we can’t attack a target using 5,000-pound bombs, it’s probably nature’s way of telling us it’s pointless,” said Owen Cote, the associate director of security studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

UCAR Lives!

Anybody remember the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft (aka, UCAR)?

UCAR was one of those futuristic concept vehicles that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (aka, DARPA) swoons over until the Army (aka, army) sees the bill, and then -- poof -- the program dies.

Well, it's back -- kind of.

When UCAR got the budget axe about two years ago, there were two teams involved. There was Lockheed Martin offering an unmanned version of the Bell Helicopter 407, with a very cool propulsive anti-torque feature (think vectored-thrust but on a helicopter). And there was Northrop Grumman offering the Kaman Aerospace K-MAX, which has inter-meshing rotors to solve that pesky (for helicopters) anti-torque issue.

Two years later, Lockheed Martin announced last week that it's getting back into the unmanned armed rotorcraft business, but with a twist: they're switching partners. Gone is the Bell 407, which, goodness knows, is in enough trouble right now.

Onboard is (drum-roll ...) their former competitor: the Kaman Aerospace K-MAX. Lockheed Martin's press release says:

"The K-MAX has proven its capabilities, at very high altitudes and in hot environments, and has demonstrated more than twelve hours of continuous flight operations as a UAS. Working with Lockheed Martin, the K MAX will realize even greater potential and hopefully serve our forces in a capacity to reduce the burden on our ground and aviation forces.”

Not surprisingly, Lockheed Martin's press release omits any direct references to the aborted UCAR program, except to mention that some of the technologies were developed under previous DARPA programs. (Yeah, we know.)

A very puzzling question this new teaming arrangement creates is -- to put it simply -- why? No obvious market exists for a highly autonomous and armed (always a troubling combination), unmanned helicopter. Perhaps Lockheed Martin can pitch it as an advanced alternative to the Northrop Grumman MQ-8B Fire Scout, but to whom? There is no sign that the Fire Scout's two customers -- the army and the navy -- would consider dumping Northrop Grumman for a more unproven alternative.

Your guess is as good as mine, in other words.

Why Russia Cheers Me Up

If you're frustrated by what you see happening with the US defense industry, here's good way to cheer up: read about the state of Russia's defense industry.

Worked for me anyway.

Stephen J. Blank, a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College, has published a new monograph, entitled: "Rosoboroneksport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry".

That's a nice title, but, I'd would humbly suggest changing it to: "How an Already Dysfunctional, Bankrupt, Corrupt, Doomed Industry Can Get Even Worse (and Play with Nukes, Too!)".

Consider this: there is something like 1,700 defense companies operating in Russia today, all but a handful of which are bankrupt. Most are relics of the Soviet system with no products, no orders and no prospects -- yet, somehow in existence anyway.

To reform this bloated, non-productive mess, Vladimir Putin and his favorite henchman -- er, Minister of Defense -- Sergei Ivanov have a really bright idea: centralize the industry under state control. (After all, when the modern economy fails you, why not take a page from the ever-popular Tsarist textbook of economics?)

Thus, senior members of the Russian government now wear second hats as executives and members of the boards of directors at Russian defense companies. Blank notes: "It is as if [former] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were a member of Lockheed Martin's Board of Directors". (Well, on second thought, maybe there are some similarities ...)

But, more alarmingly, Blank describes some notable consequences of the crisis in the Russian defense industry. Russian defense firms are forced to survive on the international arms market. Long-time customers China and India, however, are moving away from Russian arms imports. Meanwhile, an anti-US stance in the Kremlin puts no checks on sales to very unsavory customers, to include the Sudan, Venezuela, Iran and Syria.

Even worse, Russia's defense industry along with the rest of the economy may be headed for an epic crash. Says Blank:

"As history shows, it inevitably leads Russia into strategic competitions that it cannot afford and to economic and political rigor mortis. If this structure continues, can Russia -- and the globla community -- afford the crash that becomes increasingly thinkable with each more regressive step."

Like I said, it will cheer you up.

The F-35 Debate Continues

For those following the great V/STOL/Harrier/F-35B debate, here's some great responses to my responses from Mr. Ehling. Everyone feel free to join the fray.

Me: Do you really think that it's anything like an equalizer?

Ehling: I don't know. I've been told viffing gave the Harrier an edge at low altitude engagements against our own aircraft (F-16s, etc.) and Soviet aircraft (simulated) in past exercises.

The lift fan theoretically gives the F-35 a similar capacity to turn tighter for a missile shot. It might boost the roll rate as well.

Remember that they wargame these platforms in the digital domain well before they bend metal.

Your concerns are valid; the F-35 may be less than it's cracked up to be. It may be more. As a taxpayer, I'm hoping for the latter. As an American, I'm expecting a little of both.

Me: By the time the death rays are ready for service, there will be a new generation of aircraft better suited for a weapon of that kind.

Ehling: Directed energy weapons might not be as far away as you think. If they aren't, we want to get there before or the same time as everyone else. They may portend a true revolution in military affairs.

What "new generation of aircraft" are you referring to? UAVs? If so, note that the F-35 is already under consideration as an unmanned platform.

Me: Is that risk extreme enough to deserve such a costly mitigation strategy?

Ehling: I don't know. You can also ask the converse: can we afford not to mitigate the risk?

My impression is that a lot of our defense establishment looks to past American failures to keep pace with trends in world aircraft design -- i.e., WW I and II, and Korea -- and are motivated not to repeat those mistakes. Does that mean we now tend to overmitigate? Possibly.

The matter doesn't seem to be subject to easy proof or resolution, except by an exchange of opinion, like we're doing here, or maybe taking a vote. At this stage in the voting process, it looks like the F-35's moving ahead, despite your perfectly rational concerns.

Many thanks Bob. For the record, I'm a professional skeptic. But that doesn't mean I'm completely down on the F-35B or the greater Joint Strike Fighter program.

Personally, I like how my friend Robbin Laird, a defense analyst, characterizes the F-35. Robbin advises against thinking of JSF as a fifth-generation fighter, and instead as a first-generation airborne combat system. That is, as a pure fighter, the F-35 may not be the better of many earlier-generation fighters, to include the Typhoon and perhaps later-model Flankers and MiGs.

But the F-35 may be the first fighter designed from the start as part of an integrated combat system, and therefore represents the first of completely new kind of combat aircraft.

That kind of thinking makes sense to me, and I think helps to clarify the true strengths and weaknesses of the program.

Let the discussion continue.